A Tale of Two Towns: Economic Disadvantage and Political Disempowerment in Ex-Industrial England
A Tale of Two Towns: Economic Disadvantage and Political Disempowerment in Ex-Industrial England
Executive Summary
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Far from being forgotten or left behind, England’s former mining and manufacturing towns have been testing grounds for successive waves of neoliberal policymaking. Although these policies have failed at their stated aim of generating well-paying jobs, they were successful at remaking former industrial heartlands into hubs of logistics and care work. Many ex-industrial towns[1] are now dominated by low-paid work, as behemoths like Amazon take advantage of financial incentives, patchy labour rights and cheap land. Although policymakers and commentators continue to refer to ex-industrial towns as defined by the past, the actual economic structures of these areas are marked by cutting-edge innovations in exploitation and financialisation.
Crafting a progressive agenda for ex-industrial towns must start from an awareness of these histories, which continue to shape people’s everyday interactions with economic and political structures. Structural economic shifts have changed the very rhythm of these towns: how and where people interact, how people move through space and where they encounter politics. Even those former mining and manufacturing workers who enjoy good pensions and outright home ownership see their children struggle to find local employment that pays above minimum wage, driving a widespread sense of decline.[2] A deep-seated respect for hard work co-exists uneasily with an economic model dependent on exploited migrant labour. Successive politicians have promised jobs and investment which never came.[3] These socio-economic developments have reshaped the terrain of political possibility. England’s older industrial towns have steadily drifted away from Labour,[4] and winning these voters’ support for progressive causes requires a more locally grounded understanding of the experiences of economic disadvantage and political disempowerment which shape people’s politics.
This project draws on archival research and interviews with 121 residents, civic leaders, union representatives, councillors and regeneration officials in two ex-industrial towns in the Midlands in England. It focuses on two towns: Corby and Mansfield. Where Mansfield is described as “the archetypical ‘left behind’ town”,[5] Corby has received praise for its “phoenix-like” revival, as the town “emerged from the ashes of post-industrial decay”.[6] On several metrics, such as population growth, house prices and average income, Corby seems to be edging closer to larger, more prosperous cities. Once we peel back the surface, however, this tale of two towns reveals the structural forces which continue to mark ex-industrial areas. These histories reveal that it is not enough to provide zones, perks and incentives “so that it makes good business sense for the private sector to invest in areas that have for too long felt left behind.”[7] Although now forgotten, these policies have been tried before and have failed. Instead, this report proposes three central tenets for a progressive agenda for post-industrial towns: political renewal, good work and thriving commons.
Key Points
[.num-list][.num-list-num]1[.num-list-num][.num-list-text]Drawing on interviews with 121 residents, civil servants and local leaders, the report argues towns like Mansfield and Corby were not “left behind” but actively remade through neoliberal regeneration policies such as enterprise zones, land selloffs and financial perks for large businesses, most of which offered only low-paid, insecure work.[.num-list-text][.num-list]
[.num-list][.num-list-num]2[.num-list-num][.num-list-text]In Mansfield and Corby alone, policymakers have spent tens of millions of pounds of public money to attract footloose businesses, resulting in a precarious local economy. This has contributed to a deep sense of social and economic decline.[.num-list-text][.num-list]
[.num-list][.num-list-num]3[.num-list-num][.num-list-text]Although these local economies are often described as laggards, local employers have been in some ways at the very forefront, using complex financial structures and adopting novel and sometimes exploitative labour practices.[.num-list-text][.num-list]
[.num-list][.num-list-num]4[.num-list-num][.num-list-text]Some of the former civil servants and local leaders interviewed for this report express a sense of regret at the policies they championed, which benefited multinational companies but not the local population.[.num-list-text][.num-list]
[.num-list][.num-list-num]5[.num-list-num][.num-list-text]To win back support in ex-industrial areas, progressives must confront the failures of neoliberal regeneration efforts — including insecure work and the sell-off of public assets — and the resulting cynicism about politics and the UK economy.[.num-list-text][.num-list]
Key Stats
[.fig]Population[.fig]
[.fig]Population growth[.fig]
[.fig]Median full-time income[.fig]
[.fig]Social grade CD2E[.fig]
[.fig]White ethnicity[.fig]
[.fig]Average age[.fig]
[.fig]Social mobility index[.fig]
Read the full report here. Photography by Nathaniel White.
[1] The term “ex-industrial” is used interchangeably with “post-industrial”. When referring to ex-industrial towns more generally, I adopt the categorisation by Christina Beatty and Stephen Fothergill in “The contemporary labour market in Britain’s Older Industrial Towns” (2018), table 1, which lists the districts and unitary authorities covering Britain’s ex-industrial towns.
[2] Mike Savage et al., “Why Wealth Inequality Matters”, International Inequalities Institute, 2024. Available here. Lisa Mckenzie, “The Class Politics of Prejudice: Brexit and the Land of No-Hope and Glory”, The British Journal of Sociology 68, no. S1 (2017).
[3] Ray Hudson and Huw Beynon, The Shadow of the Mine: Coal and the End of Industrial Britain, Verso, 2021.
[4] Jamie Furlong, “The Changing Electoral Geography of England and Wales: Varieties of ’Left-Behindedness’”, Political Geography 75 (1 November 2019); Jamie Furlong and Will Jennings, The Changing Electoral Map of England and Wales (Oxford University Press, 2024).
[5] C. P. Berry, “Answering the Mansfield Question: Labour’s Proletariat Problem”, IPPR Progressive Review 24, no. 2 (2017).pp. 125–36; similarly in Kira Gartzou-Katsouyanni et al., “Understanding Brexit Impacts at a Local Level “ (Conflict and civil society research unit, 2018); Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath, “Brexit Vote Explained: Poverty, Low Skills and Lack of Opportunities “, 26 August 2016. Available here.
[6] Rob Davies, “How the Town of Corby Dusted off the Ashes of Post-Industrial Decay”, The Guardian, 27 May 2016. Available here. For an example of academic work praising Corby see Patricia G Rice and Anthony J Venables, “The Persistent Consequences of Adverse Shocks: How the 1970s Shaped UK Regional Inequality”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 37, no. 1 (5 April 2021), pp.132–51.
[7] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “Levelling Up the UK [White Paper]” (Crown, 2022). Available here.
